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Abstract
Climate policies have stochastic consequences that involve a great number of
generations. This calls for evaluating social risk (what kind of societies will fu-
ture people be born into) rather than individual risk (what will happen to people
during their own lifetimes). We respond to this call by proposing and axiomatiz-
ing probability adjusted rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarianism
(PARDCLU) through a key axiom ensuring that the social welfare order both is
ethical and satisfies first-order stochastic dominance. PARDCLU yields a new
useful perspective on intergenerational risks, is ethical in contrast to discounted
utilitarianism, and avoids objections that have been raised against other ethical
criteria. We show that PARDCLU handles situations with positive probability
of human extinction and is linked to decision theory by yielding rank-dependent
expected utilitarianism—but with additional structure—in a special case.
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1 Introduction
This paper proposes a new normative criterion that can potentially be used for rank-
ing climate policies. Climate policies seeking to abate anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions have extremely long-term stochastic consequences, as greenhouse gas emis-
sions cause environmental risks that extend into the far future. Therefore, to eval-
uate such policies one must assess risks that involve a great number of generations.
In this time frame, where people’s lives are short compared to the time period
for which the policies will have an effect, the objective social risk concerning
what kind of societies will future people be born into
might be more important than the subjective individual risk concerning
what will happen to people during their own lifetimes.
That is, it might be reasonable to be more concerned about reducing the probability
that future people will lead miserable lives, rather than avoiding volatility in the
living conditions that people experience within their own lifetimes.
This motivates an approach that abstracts from lifetime fluctuations by assuming
that people live for one period only. Moreover, the lives of the ‘same’ individual in
two different future realizations might be considered as the lives of two different
people, each living with the probability assigned to the realizations in question.
Hence, if a future individual has equal probability of living a good or bad life, then
this might be modeled as two different people, one living a good life and one living
a bad life, where each has probability 0.5 of coming into existence.
Different normative considerations arise in a setting where people do not ex-
perience fluctuations and risk within their own lifetime. In particular, we are not
concerned about individual risk attitudes and the risk generations may face from an
abstract ex ante point of view. We are only concerned with the final distribution
of well-being. The important question for the evaluation of policies with long-term
intergenerational effects is how to handle inequality. Clearly, if, for each chosen pol-
icy, all people – now and in all future realizations – have the same level of lifetime
well-being, then this uniform well-being level can be used to rank policies. Thus, in
our context, only social aversion to inequality matters, while subjective aversions to
individual fluctuations and risk play no role.
By focusing on social risks, our approach differs from the vast literature on
the aggregation of preferences under risk and uncertainty stemming from Harsanyi’s
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(1955) seminal contribution. This literature has focused on respecting people prefer-
ences, in a context where the society and the individuals face the ‘same’ uncertainty,
in the sense that uncertainty does not concern the mere existence of people. The
contributions have wavered between an ex ante approach that relaxes rationality (Di-
amond, 1967; Epstein and Segal, 1992) to allow for ex ante fairness, and an ex post
approach that fails the ex ante Pareto principle (Broome, 1991; Fleurbaey, 2010) to
allow for ex post fairness. In the present paper, these issues do not arise because
we interpret individuals in different events as different individuals: individuals are
born only after the realization of events relevant for their lives. This interpretation
is consistent with other papers focusing on social risk rather than individual risks
(for instance Asheim and Brekke, 2002; Piacquadio, 2014).
In the framework of Harsanyi’s (1953) impartial observer theorem, Grant at al.
(2010) have highlighted the distinction in social evaluation between lotteries over
identities and lotteries over outcomes. We focus on lotteries over identities but add
the complication that people may exist with different probabilities. We also depart
from expected utility to address population ethics and equity concerns.
Our analysis will be confined to the case where there are objective assessments of
the probabilities of different realizations. Hence, formally we will be concerned with
risk rather than uncertainty. Moreover, we will assume that there is an indicator of
lifetime well-being which is at least ordinally measurable and level comparable across
people. Following the usual convention in population ethics, we will normalize the
well-being scale so that lifetime well-being equal to 0 represents neutrality. Hence,
a life with lifetime well-being above 0 is worth living; below 0, it is not.
We are concerned with normative evaluation where people are treated equally.
This differs from the common use of discounted utilitarianism in integrated assess-
ment models of climate change, where transformed well-being (utility) is discounted
by a constant and positive per-period time-discount rate. As a matter of principle,
utilitarianism with time-discounting means that people across time are not treated
equally. As a matter of practical policy evaluation, this criterion is virtually insen-
sitive to the long-term effects of climate change, beyond year 2100 when the most
serious consequences will occur, in particular for poor groups who are expected to
bear the highest costs (see for instance World Bank, 2013).
Equal treatment of people in axiomatic analysis is captured by the Anonymity
axiom, whereby social evaluation is invariant to permuting two individuals’ well-
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being. Combined with sensitivity for the interests of all people, as captured by
the Strong Pareto principle, this leads to the Suppes-Sen principle (Suppes, 1966;
Sen, 1970). This principle requires that one allocation be better than another if the
former dominates the latter when being rank-ordered according to the levels of well-
being. Conversely, the Suppes-Sen principle combined with the Continuity axiom
implies both Anonymity and the Strong Pareto principle. A criterion that satisfies
the Suppes-Sen principle is called ethical by Svensson (1980). In this paper, we
characterize an ethical criterion that avoids objections raised against other ethical
criteria, e.g. utilitarian and egalitarian criteria.
Undiscounted utilitarianism, where utility is summed without discounting, is
one criterion which satisfies the Suppes-Sen principle. However, when modeling the
many potential future people by assuming that there are infinitely many generations,
this criterion assigns zero relative weight to the present generation’s interests. It
leads to the unappealing prescription that the present generation should endure
heavy sacrifices even if it contributes to only a tiny gain for all future generations.
Moreover, in a variable population setting with an unbounded number of potential
people, it is subject to the Repugnant conclusion1 or the Very sadistic conclusion.2
The egalitarian criterion of maximizing the well-being of the worst-off generation
(maximin) also satisfies the Suppes-Sen principle, but assigns zero relative weight to
all generations but the worst-off. It leads to the unappealing prescription that the
present generation should not do an even negligible sacrifice for the benefit of better
off future generations. Maximin has also problematic implications when applied in
a variable population setting (Arrhenius, forthcoming; Asheim and Zuber, 2014).
This dilemma – that ethical criteria may to lead to extreme prescriptions in terms
of sacrifice for future generations – motivates rank-discounted generalized utilitari-
anism (RDU), proposed and analyzed by Zuber and Asheim (2012). RDU discounts
future utility as long as the future is better off than the present, thereby trading-off
current sacrifice and future gain. However, if the present generation is better off
than all future generations, then priority shifts to the future. In this case, zero
1The Repugnant conclusion (Parfit, 1976, 1982, 1984) states that, for any large population in
which people have high levels of well-being, there is a larger population in which people have lives
barely worth living that is deemed socially better.
2The Very sadistic conclusion (Arrhenius, 2000, forthcoming) states that, for any population in
which people have terrible lives not worth living, there is a larger population in which everyone has
a life worth living that is deemed socially worse.
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relative weight is assigned to present utility. RDU is compatible with equal treat-
ment of generations as discounting is made according to rank, not according to time.
Asheim and Zuber (2014) extend RDU to a variable population setting by proposing
and axiomatizing rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarianism (RDCLU).
RDCLU avoids both the Repugnant and Very sadistic conclusions, thereby evading
serious objections raised against other variable population criteria.
In the present paper we extend RDCLU to risky situations, including the case
with positive probability of human extinction, by proposing the probability adjusted
rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarian (PARDCLU) social welfare or-
der (Definition 1). We start out in Section 2 by developing a framework where each
(potential) individual is characterized by a level of lifetime well-being and a proba-
bility of existence. We show how this set-up is equivalent to a formulation where the
individuals are distributed through time and over risky states. In this alternative
dynamic framework individuals live for one period only and are not subjected to
risk during their lifetime, reflecting our intergenerational perspective.
We then, in Section 3, present an axiomatic foundation for PARDCLU through
Theorem 1. A key axiom, called Probability adjusted Suppes-Sen, generalizes the
Suppes-Sen principle to a setting where people need not exist with probability one.
In conjunction with the Continuity axiom, it implies invariance to permutations of
individuals with the same well-being and the same probability of existence. It also
entails invariance to the replacement of one individual with given well-being and
probability with two individuals having the same well-being and whose probabilities
of existence sum up the probability of the original individual. In the special case
where the individual probabilities of existence sum up to one, Probability adjusted
Suppes-Sen corresponds to first-order stochastic dominance. Hence, this axiom can
be also considered as a generalization of first-order stochastic dominance to a norma-
tive multi-person setting. The proof of Theorem 1 (contained in Appendix A) shows
that, although the axiomatic system is closely related to the one found in Asheim
and Zuber (2014, Section 3), our main result is not a trivial extension, because
probabilities are real numbers and we only use a weak Continuity axiom.
In Section 4 we illustrate the usefulness of PARDCLU by showing how PARD-
CLU handles human extinction. Moreover, when individual probabilities of existence
sum up to one, PARDCLU yields rank-dependent expected utilitarianism, but with
additional structure. This additional structure derives from the axiom Existence
4
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independence of the worst-off, which plays the same role as Koopmans’ (1960) sta-
tionarity postulate. In Section 5 we demonstrate additional properties (proven in
Appendix B) of PARDCLU in terms of distributional equity and population ethics.
In the final Section 6 we discuss some issues faced by the PARDCLU approach and
provide concluding remarks.
2 Two equivalent frameworks
In this section we establish a perfect correspondence between an abstract framework
with a set of atemporal allocations and a more descriptive dynamic framework. Our
axiomatization will be developed in the former framework for the sake of simplicity.
Allocations and social welfare relation. Let N denote positive integers and N0
denote the non-negative integers. Let R denote the real numbers and R+ (resp.
R++) denote the non-negative (resp. positive) real numbers.
Individuals are described by two numbers: their lifetime well-being and their
probability of existence. An allocation x ∈ (R× (0, 1])n determines the finite popu-
lation size, n(x) = n, and the distribution of pairs of well-being and probability,
x =
(
x1, . . . , xn(x)
)
=
(
(xw1 , x
p
1), . . . , (x
w
n(x), x
p
n(x))
)
,
among the n(x) individuals who make up the population. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n(x)},
xwi is the individual’s well-being and x
p
i is his probability of existence. We denote
by ν(x) =
∑n(x)
i=1 x
p
i the probability adjusted population size of x and by
X =
⋃
n∈N
(R× (0, 1])n
the set of possible finite allocations.
As mentioned in the introduction, we follow the usual convention in population
ethics, by letting lifetime well-being equal to 0 represents neutrality, above which a
life, as a whole, is worth living, and below which, it is not.
A social welfare relation (SWR) on the set X is a binary relation %, where for
all x, y ∈ X, x % y implies that the allocation x is deemed socially at least as good
as y. Let ∼ and  denote the symmetric and asymmetric parts of %.
For each x ∈ X, let pi : {1, . . . , n(x)} → {1, . . . , n(x)} be a bijection that reorders
individuals in increasing well-being order:
5
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xwpi(r) ≤ xwpi(r+1) for all r ∈ {1, . . . , n(x)− 1} .
Let ρ0 = 0 and define the probability adjusted rank ρr inductively as follows:
ρr = x
p
pi(r) + ρr−1
for r ∈ {1, . . . , n(x)}. Define the rank-ordered allocation x[ ] : (0, ν(x)]→ R by
x[ρ] = x
w
pi(r) for ρr−1 < ρ ≤ ρr and 1 < r ≤ n(x)
and write x[0] := limρ↓0 x[ρ]. Note that the permutation pi need not be unique (if,
for instance, xwi = x
w
i′ for some i 6= i′), but the resulting rank-ordered allocation x[ ]
is unique. Note also that the definitions imply that ρn(x) = ν(x).
For every ν ∈ R, write Xν = {x ∈ X : ν(x) = ν} for the set of finite allocations
with probability adjusted population size equal to ν. For x, y ∈ Xν , write x[ ] > y[ ]
if x[ρ] ≥ y[ρ] for all ρ ∈ (0, ν] and x[ρ′] > y[ρ′] for some ρ′ ∈ (0, ν]; note that, by the
definitions of the step functions x[ ] and y[ ], x[ρ′] > y[ρ′] implies that x[ρ] > y[ρ] for
all ρ in a subset of (0, ν] that includes a non-empty proper interval.
For z ∈ R, p ∈ (0, 1] and n ∈ N, let x ∈ (R× (0, 1])n with (xwi , xpi ) = (z, p) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be denoted by (z)ν , where ν = np. For x ∈ X, z ∈ R, p ∈ (0, 1] and
n ∈ N, let y ∈ (R×(0, 1])n(x)+n such that (ywi , ypi ) = (xwi , xpi ) for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n(x)}
and (ywi , y
p
i ) = (z, p) for all i ∈ {n(x) + 1, . . . , n(x) + n} be denoted by
(
x, (z)np
)
.
Equivalent dynamic model. The concept of an allocation developed above can be
derived from a formulation where the individuals are distributed through time and
over risky states and where the social decision maker can influence the information
obtained in successive time periods.
Let Ω be the space of states of the world. Endow Ω with the σ–algebra F , being
the collection of all Lebesgue measurable subsets of Ω, and a probability measure
p : F → [0, 1], so that (Ω,F , p) is a probability space. The states are exogenously
given and their probabilities cannot be influenced. One can think of the probabilities
as a priori expert opinions used by the social decision maker in a Bayesian setting.
We assume that time is discrete. An information structure, (It)t∈N, determines
the process through which the true state is learned. Formally, I1, I2, . . . , It, . . . is a
countable sequence of finite partitions of Ω where, for each t ∈ N, (i) p(it) > 0 for
all it ∈ It and (ii) It+1 is a weak refinement of It. The information structure (It)t∈N
determines a filtration (Ft)t∈N of F where, for each t ∈ N, Ft is the collection of all
6
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unions of sets in It (including the empty set).
For given information structure (It)t∈N, an allocation process, w = (wt)t∈N, is a
process from N× Ω to ⋃n∈N0 Rn which is adapted to the filtration (Ft)t∈N so that,
for each t ∈ N, wt : Ω→ ⋃n∈N0 Rn is an Ft–measurable function. Here R0 represents
the set containing only the situation where no one exists. The allocation process w
maps each period-state pair (t, ω) ∈ N × Ω into wt(ω) ∈ Rn, which determines the
population size, ntw(ω) = n and the distribution of well-being,
wt(ω) = (wt1(ω), . . . , w
t
ntw(ω)
(ω)) ,
if ntw(ω) > 0 and the situation where no one exists if n
t
w(ω) = 0. Thus, w determines
a population process, nw = (n
t
w)t∈N, where, for each t ∈ N, ntw : Ω → N0 is an Ft–
measurable function. We require that, for any allocation process w, there exists
t(w) ∈ N such that ntw(ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω if and only if t > t(w). Hence, the total
probability adjusted population size,
∑
t∈N
∫
Ω n
t
w(ω)dp(ω), is positive and finite.
The social decision maker evaluates ((It)t∈N,w). For any such pair, we obtain,
for each period t ∈ N and each smallest non-empty Ft–measurable event it ∈ It with
ntw(i
t) > 0, a distribution of pairs of wellbeing and probability:(
(wt1(i
t), p(it)), . . . , (wtntw(it)(i
t), p(it))
)
.
Concatenating such vectors over all periods t ∈ N and all events it ∈ It with nt(it) >
0 yields a vector x in the set of possible finite allocations, X, since there are only a
finite number of period-event pairs (t, it) with positive population. In particular, the
probability adjusted population size of x, ν(x), equals
∑
t∈N
∫
Ω n
t
w(ω)dp(ω). This
establishes that any pair ((It)t∈N,w) can be mapped to an allocation in X.
Conversely, we can map any allocation x =
(
(xw1 , x
p
1), . . . , (x
w
n(x), x
p
n(x))
)
∈ X
to a pair ((It)t∈N,w). To see that, first re-order the components of x to obtain a
new allocation x˜ such that x˜pk ≥ x˜pk+1 for all k = 1, · · · , n(x) − 1 (noting that a
permutation pi such that (x˜wk , x˜
p
k) = (x
w
pi(k), x
p
pi(k)) for all k = 1, · · · , n(x) exists).
Construct the sequence (It)n∈N of partitions inductively in the following way:
1. If x˜p1 = 1, then I
1 = {Ω} with E1 denoting ∅, and if x˜p1 < 1, then I1 = {i1,
Ω \ E1}, where i1 ( Ω is chosen so that p(Ω \ E1) = x˜p1 with E1 denoting i1;
2. For t = 2, · · · , n(x), if x˜pk+1 = x˜pk, then It = It−1 with Et denoting Et−1, and
if x˜pk+1 < x˜
p
k, then I
t =
(
It−1 ∪ {it,Ω \ Et}
) \ {Ω \Et−1}, where it ( Ω \Et−1
7
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is chosen so that p(Ω \ Et) = x˜pt with Et denoting Et−1 ∪ it.
3. For t > n(x), It = In(x) with Et denoting Ω.
Construct the adapted allocation process w = (wt)t∈N by, for all t ∈ N, wt(ω) = x˜wt
if ω ∈ Ω\Et and wt(ω) maps to the situation where no one exists if ω ∈ Et. Hence, in
each period there exists at most one individual and only in periods t ≤ n(x) and in
states whose total probability is x˜pt . The well-being of the individual in period t when
he exists is x˜wt . Clearly, the pair ((I
t)t∈N,w) permits to produce the allocation x˜ of
well-being and probabilities of existence, which is the same as x up to a permutation.
There are of course more realistic ways of doing so, where e.g. individuals with the
same probability of existence belong to the same generation.
The pair ((It)t∈N,w) is endogenously given by the policies chosen in the economy.
The information structure (It)t∈N can change depending on the decision maker’s
investment to learn about the true state of the world. For instance, in the case of
climate change, more resources can be allocated to better understand how climate
systems work and what are the effects of temperature change. This makes it possible
to accelerate the refinement of the state space partition.
In this formulation, individuals’ identities are implicitly defined by the informa-
tion structure. An individual at time t exists only in one event it of the partition It
that reflects the information available at period t. This also implies that individuals
live for one period only and are not subjected to risk during their lifetime.3 Each
potential individual is born after the realization of the event relevant for his identity,
and all risk in the economy is borne by society. Our focus on intergenerational issues
motivates this abstraction from lifetime fluctuations and individual risk.
The choice of the pair ((It)t∈N,w) will be limited by the feasibility constraints
concerning the possibility for learning and the development of well-being and pop-
ulation. As we are concerned with modeling the social decision maker’s preferences
over such pairs, such feasibility constraints will not be discussed here.
3Alternatively, one could assume that there is another layer of risk related to individual lifetime
fluctuations and that the well-being measures wti already incorporate it (they may be expected
utilities or certainty equivalent measures).
8
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3 Axioms and representation result
Probability adjusted rank-discounted critical-level utilitarianism can be character-
ized by the following seven axioms.
The first three axioms are sufficient to ensure numerical representation of the
SWR for any fixed probability adjusted population size. They also entail that indi-
viduals are treated anonymously and with sensitivity to their well-being.
Axiom 1 (Order) The relation % is complete, reflexive and transitive on X.
An SWR satisfying Axiom 1 is called a social welfare order (SWO).
Axiom 2 (Continuity) For all ν ∈ R++ and x ∈ Xν , the sets
{
y ∈ Xν : y % x
}
and
{
y ∈ X : x % y} are closed for the topology induced by the supnorm applied to
rank-ordered allocations.4
Axiom 3 (Probability adjusted Suppes-Sen) For all ν ∈ R++ and x, y ∈ Xν ,
if x[ ] > y[ ], then x  y.
Jointly with Axiom 2, Axiom 3 implies anonymity wrt. different individuals with the
same probability of existence. Hence, permuting the well-being levels of individuals
with the same probability of existence leads to an equally good allocation.
In line with Asheim and Zuber’s (2014) axiomatization of rank-discounted critical-
level utilitarianism we impose independence to adding an individual only if the added
individual is best-off (relative to two allocations with the same probability adjusted
population size) or worst-off.
Axiom 4 (Existence independence of the best-off) For all ν ∈ R++, x, y ∈
Xν , p ∈ (0, 1], and z ∈ R satisfying z ≥ max{x[ν],y[ν]}, (x, (z)p) % (y, (z)p) if and
only if x % y.
Axiom 5 (Existence independence of the worst-off) For all x, y ∈ X, p ∈
(0, 1], and z ∈ R satisfying z ≤ min{x[0],y[0]}, (x, (z)p) % (y, (z)p) if and only if
x % y.
4This means that we use the metric d(x, y) = supr∈[0,ν]|x[r] − y[r]|. In functional spaces, the
topology induced by the sup metric is strong, so that the associated notion of continuity is weak.
This is an advantage of our definition.
9
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Moreover, we introduce a critical well-being level c ∈ R+, which if experienced
by an added individual without changing the utilities of the existing population,
leads to an alternative which is as good as the original if x[ν(x)] ≤ c. Since c ≥ 0, c
is at least as large as the neutral well-being level.
Axiom 6 (Existence of a critical level) There exist c ∈ R+ and ν ∈ R++ such
that for all p ∈ (0, 1] and x ∈ Xν satisfying x[ν] ≤ c, (x, (c)p) ∼ x.
In the case with no risk (i.e., for the subset of allocations with xpi = 1 for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n(x)}), all axioms above are satisfied also by ordinary critical-level
utilitarianism. However, as discussed by Arrhenius (forthcoming, Sect. 5.1), critical-
level utilitarianism has the properties that adding sufficiently many individuals with
well-being just above c makes the allocation better than any fixed alternative (thus
leading to the Repugnant conclusion if c = 0) and adding sufficiently many individu-
als with well-being just below c makes the allocation worse than any fixed alternative
(thus leading to the Very sadistic conclusion if c > 0). The following axiom ensures
that adding individuals at a given level of lifetime well-being has bounded impor-
tance, thereby avoiding the Repugnant and Very sadistic conclusions.
Axiom 7 (Existence of egalitarian equivalence) For all x, y ∈ X and p ∈
(0, 1], if x  y, then there exists z ∈ R such that, for all N ∈ N, x  (z)np  y for
some n ≥ N .
We will now state our main result, namely that these seven axioms characterize
the probability adjusted rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarian SWOs.
Definition 1 An SWR % on X is a probability adjusted rank-discounted critical-
level generalized utilitarian (PARDCLU) SWO if there exist c ∈ R+, δ ∈ R++, and
a continuous and increasing function u : R→ R such that, for all x, y ∈ X,
x % y ⇔
∫ ν(x)
0
e−δρ
(
u(x[ρ])− u(c)
)
dρ ≥
∫ ν(y)
0
e−δρ
(
u(y[ρ])− u(c)
)
dρ .
Parameter δ is the rank utility discount rate.
Theorem 1 The following two statements are equivalent.
(1) The SWR % satisfies Axioms 1–7.
10
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(2) The SWR % is a PARDCLU SWO.
It follows from the PARDCLU SWO that c is the well-being level which, if ex-
perienced by an added individual without changing the utilities of the existing pop-
ulation, leads to an alternative which is as good as the original only if x[ν(x)] ≤ c.
If x[ν(x)] > c, then there is a context-dependent critical level in the open interval
(c,x[ν(x)]) which depends on the well-being levels that exceed c (as well as the proba-
bility p with which the added individual exists). This follows from Definition 1, since
adding an individual at well-being level x[ν(x)] increases welfare, while adding an in-
dividual at well-being level c lowers the weights assigned to individuals at well-being
levels that exceed c and thereby reduces welfare.
4 Special cases
Cases with no risk correspond to situations where only allocations x = ((xw1 , x
p
1), . . . ,
(xwn(x), x
p
n(x))) with x
p
i = 1 for all i = 1, . . . n(x) are considered. In the dynamic
formulation presented in Section 2, these correspond to cases where It = {Ω} in all
periods: states of the world are indistinguishable and do not affect well-being.
The implications of rank-discounted utilitarianism in such settings are discussed
in Zuber and Asheim (2012) and Asheim and Zuber (2014). With no risk the
modeling here translates exactly to the variable population framework of Asheim
and Zuber (2014), while it specializes the fixed population framework of Zuber and
Asheim (2012) to a situation with an unbounded but finite number of generations.
In this section, we highlight special cases with risk. First, we show how PARDCLU
reduces to rank-dependent expected utilitarianism in the special case where the
probability adjusted population size is equal to 1. Second, we discuss to what ex-
tent PARDCLU provides a foundation for discounting according to the probability
of human extinction, as applied in, e.g., the Stern Review (2007, Ch. 2).
Rank-dependent expected utilitarianism. In the special fixed population case
where only allocations x with probability adjusted population size ν(x) =
∑n(x)
i=1 x
p
i
equal to 1 is considered, the result of Theorem 1 leads to rank-dependent expected
utility maximization – where the decision maker substitutes ‘decision weights’ for
probability – but with additional structure. Quiggin (1982) was the first to axioma-
tize such a theory for decisions under risk, even though the substitution of ‘decision
11
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weights’ for probability had been argued by earlier writers to explain behavior in-
consistent with the vNM theory.
In the dynamic formulation presented in Section 2, where information is obtained
in successive time periods, this corresponds to the case where the information struc-
ture (It)t∈N is given by It = I = (i1, . . . , iS) for all t ∈ N and the allocation process
w is such that, for all s ∈ {1, . . . , S}, ntw(is) = 1 if t = 1 and ntw(is) = 0 if t > 1.
Hence, we have essentially a static model where there is one individual existing (in
period 1 only) independently of how the risk is resolved. We may choose to interpret
this as one person being subject to a lottery where the prizes (w1(i1), . . . , w
1(iS))
are won with probabilities (p(i1), . . . , p(iS)), even though we thereby depart from
our basic setting without individual risk.
Let pi : {1, · · · , S} → {1, · · · , S} be a reordering of {1, · · · , S} that turns (w1(i1),
· · · , w1(iS)) into a non-decreasing profile: w1(ipi(r)) ≤ w1(ipi(r+1)) for all ranks
r = 1, · · · , S − 1. Write p := (p(ipi(1)), · · · , p(ipi(S))). Then PARDCLU implies
preferences for lotteries that are represented by:
∑S
r=1
hr(p)u
(
w1(ipi(r))
)
,
where the probability weighting functions hr : [0, 1]
S → [0, 1] are defined by
hr(p) = f
(∑r
r′=1
p(ipi(r′))
)
− f
(∑r−1
r′=1
p(ipi(r′))
)
,
with f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] given by f(ρ) = (1− e−δρ)/(1− e−δ) and using the convention∑0
r′=1p(ipi(r′)) = 0.
5 Note that the function f is concave; the plausibility of this
property is discussed by Quiggin (1987). Our axioms (in particular, Axiom 5) lead
to the special exponential structure displayed by function f . As can be easily checked
by applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule, f approaches the identify function as δ ↓ 0. Thus, if the
probability adjusted population size equals 1, then PARDCLU approaches ordinary
expected utility maximization as rank-discounting vanishes.
Human extinction. By appealing to Harsanyi’s (1953) original position and us-
ing Harsanyi’s (1955) theorem, Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp. 269–275) justified the
use of discounted utilitarianism where the utility discount rate is the probability of
5This follows from Definition 1 by integrating the utility weights e−δρ, leading to the follow-
ing cumulative utility weights:
∫ ρ
0
e−δρ
′
dρ′ = − (e−δρ − 1) /δ. The function f is determined by
multiplying these cumulative weights by δ/
(
1− e−δ) so that f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1.
12
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human extinction. Also the Stern Review (2007, Ch. 2) argued that this probabil-
ity is the primary justification for utility discounting (other contributions include
Bommier and Zuber, 2008, and Roemer, 2011). Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson
(2007) supported this justification within a variable population framework. To what
extent is PARDCLU consistent with this position?
The variable population case where population remains constant up to the time of
human extinction can be captured in the dynamic formulation presented in Section
2. We assume that the information structure (It)n∈N is a sequence of partitions
constructed as follows, where Et denote the event that extinction has occurred by
period t, and where the induction is initiated by setting I0 = {Ω} and E0 = ∅:
• For t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, It = (It−1 ∪ {it,Ω \ Et})\{Ω\Et−1}, with ∅ 6= it ( Ω\Et−1
and Et denoting Et−1 ∪ it.
• For t > T , It = IT with Et denoting Ω.
We denote by pit = p(Ω \ Et)/p(Ω \ Et−1) the probability of survival in period t
(∈ {1, · · · , T}) conditional on survival until t. For simplicity, we assume that pit = pi
(constant rate of survival). Hence the probability of existence of generation t is pit.
Construct the adapted allocation process w = (wt)t∈N by, for all t ∈ N, wt(ω) =
xwt if ω ∈ Ω \ Et and wt(ω) maps to the situation where no one exists if ω ∈ Et.
Hence, we assume that population is constant and its size is normalized to 1 up to
the time of extinction. If well-being is correlated with time so that wt ≤ wt+1 for all
periods t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, then PARDCLU implies preferences over streams that are
represented by: ∑T
t=1
[
f
(
pi(1−pit)
1−pi
)
− f
(
pi(1−pit−1)
1−pi
)]
u(wt) ,
where, as above, f : R+ → R+ is given by f(ρ) = (1− e−δρ)/(1− e−δ), but with an
extended domain. This follows from Definition 1 and the argument of footnote 5 by
noting that pi + · · ·+ pit = pi(1− pit)/(1− pi).
Note that as δ ↓ 0, f approaches the identity function:
f
(
pi(1−pit)
1−pi
)
− f
(
pi(1−pit−1)
1−pi
)
→ pi1−pi
(
pit−1 − pit) = pit .
Therefore, as rank-discounting vanishes, PARDCLU approaches the principle of dis-
counting utility according to the probability of human extinction, as applied by the
13
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Stern Review (2007, Ch. 2). However, for δ > 0, PARDCLU implies that utility
is discounted according to both rank and the probability of human extinction. If
well-being is correlated with time—which is the case considered above—discounting
according to rank and the probability of human extinction reinforce each other,
while they might pull in opposite directions otherwise. In all cases, well-being is
also discounted according to the absolute well-being level if the function u is strictly
concave, so that well-being is transformed into utility at a decreasing rate.
5 Equity and population ethics
We introduce equity concerns as inequality aversion with respect to the distribution
of well-being. We follow the practice of expressing distributional equity ideals though
a transfer axioms by considering a variation of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle,
but take into account the fact that people may have different probabilities of existing.
Axiom 8 (Probability adjusted Pigou-Dalton) For any x,y ∈ X, if n(x) =
n(y) = n and there exist i, j ∈ {1, · · · , n} and ε ∈ R++ such that ywi + ε = xwi ≤
xwj = y
w
j −ε, ypi = xpi = xpj = ypj and (xwk , xpk) = (ywk , ypk) for all k ∈ {1, · · · , n}\{i, j},
then x  y.
The condition under which Axiom 8 can be satisfied by PARDCLU criteria boils
down to the concavity of the function u.
Proposition 1 A PARDCLU SWO % on X satisfies Axiom 8 if and only if u is
concave in the representation given in Definition 1.
The concavity of u is a standard condition for generalized utilitarian criteria
respecting the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. It is however more surprising to
find this condition for rank-dependent generalized utilitarian criteria. Indeed, in the
similar case of risk aversion of rank-dependent expected utility criteria, Chateauneuf,
Cohen and Meilijson (2005) proved that risk aversion implies that the probability
transformation function must be more convex than the function u (function u must
not be ‘too convex’): the concavity of u is sufficient but not necessary for risk
aversion. Zuber and Asheim (2012) showed that in the case of RDU criteria, the
corresponding necessary and sufficient condition for inequality aversion was that an
index of non-concavity of the function u was larger than β = e−δ. The difference in
14
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the presence setting is that we may have to compare individuals with arbitrarily small
probabilities of existence so that the role of rank-discounting for ensuring inequality
aversion becomes negligeable: we are then close to the generalized-utilitarian case
where the concavity of u is necessary.
Interestingly, the Probability adjusted Pigou-Dalton principle can also be used
to characterize PARDCLU together with critical-level generalized utilitarian criteria
without assuming the Existence of egalitarian equivalence (Axiom 7). Let us first
define probability adjusted critical-level generalized utilitarian SWOs.
Definition 2 An SWR % on X is a probability adjusted critical-level generalized
utilitarian (PACLU) SWO if there exist c ∈ R+ and a continuous and increasing
function u : R→ R such that, for all x, y ∈ X,
x % y ⇔
∫ ν(x)
0
(
u(x[ρ])− u(c)
)
dρ ≥
∫ ν(y)
0
(
u(y[ρ])− u(c)
)
dρ .
Proposition 2 If The SWR % on X satisfies Axioms 1–6 and Axiom 8, then it
is either a PARDCLU SWO with u being concave or a PACLU SWO with u being
strictly concave.
Asheim and Zuber (2014) discuss the population ethics of RDCLU when com-
paring populations of different sizes. In particular, they show that RDCLU criteria
can avoid both the Repugnant conclusion and the Very sadistic conclusion. These
results hold also for PARDCLU in terms of probability adjusted population size.
Through the following two propositions we provide additional results on the
population ethics of PARDCLU. We first study what is the appropriate level of the
critical-level parameter c in the representation of PARDCLU given in Definition 1.
To do so, we consider the following principles discussed in Blackorby, Bossert and
Donaldson (2005).
Axiom 9 (Priority to lives worth living) For any x, y ∈ R, for any ν, ν ′ ∈
R++, if x > 0 ≥ y then (x)ν  (y)ν′.
Proposition 3 A PARDCLU SWO % on X satisfies Axiom 9 if and only if c = 0
in the representation given in Definition 1.
Proposition 3 suggests that setting c = 0 is a natural choice if we consider that
only lives above the neutrality level are worth living.
15
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Another well-known principle of population ethics is the Mere addition princi-
ple, stating that it is always worth adding people with positive well-being. In our
framework, it is formalized in the following way.
Axiom 10 (Mere addition) For any x ∈ X, for any z ∈ R++, and for any p ∈
(0, 1], (x, (z)p)  x.
PARDCLU criteria do not satisfy the Mere addition principle. This is clear when
c > 0 because adding people with well-being below c decreases social welfare. This
is also true when c = 0 because adding an individual with low positive well-being
will decrease the weights on individuals with higher well-being and might thereby
worsen the allocation. However, this drawback of PARDCLU must be considered in
light of the following impossibility result.
Proposition 4 There is no SWO % on X satisfying Axioms 1, 7, 8, 9 and 10.
Proposition 4 is related to the finding of Carlson (1998) that the Mere addition
principle and a Non-anti egalitarianism principle imply a conclusion similar to the
Repugnant conclusion. In our framework, avoiding the Repugnant conclusion is
represented by our Axiom 7 and we use a Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (Axiom
8) to represent egalitarian concerns. The form of PARDCLU criteria also indicates
why we may not want to satisfy the Mere addition principle: adding people with
positive but very low well-being may increase relative poverty by adding people at
low ranks in the distribution. This is an objection which is often made against the
Mere addition principle (Arrhenius, forthcoming, chap. 7).
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
The present paper contributes to the fields of population ethics and social evalu-
ation in risky situations by proposing and axiomatizing the probability adjusted
rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarian (PARDCLU) SWO. We have
shown how the PARDCLU approach can be used to handle the situation where
there is a positive probability of human extinction. We have established how the
PARDCLU SWO reduces to rank-dependent expected utility maximization with ad-
ditional structure in the special case where the probability adjusted population size
equals 1, thereby linking our criterion to the theory of decisions under risk. We
16
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have also highlighted some of the properties of the PARDCLU approach in terms of
distributive equity and population ethics. On the latter topic, we have showed that
PARDCLU can avoid drawbacks of other equitable approaches (such as utilitarian
and egalitarian approaches).
When evaluating consequences that stretch centuries into the future, it seems less
important to consider the fluctuations in well-being and individual risk that people
face during their own lifetimes. Rather, the important issues are interpersonal in-
equality and the social risk associated with what level of well-being future people
will experience in the world they will be born into. Consequently, we have presented
a framework where individuals live for one period only and are not subject to indi-
vidual risk. In this framework one cannot differentiate between inequality aversion,
fluctuation aversion, and risk aversion – a distinction that is sometimes highlighted
in literature on climate change evaluation. Only inequality aversion matters in the
present context.
Notwithstanding its advantages, PARDCLU also faces difficulties. First PARD-
CLU SWOs are not expected utilities. Hammond (1983) suggested that if social
decision-making is consequentialist (that is, if social situations in each state of the
world are assessed only on basis of their consequences in this state of the world),
non-expected utility criteria induce time inconsistent choices. This issue also arises
for the PARDCLU approach when there is no risk, as discussed in Zuber and Asheim
(2012), if decision making is time invariant. The problem of time consistency when
there is risk is however more severe because not only the past, but also unrealized
states of the world matter for social evaluation. This dependence on unrealized
states of the world is not specific to PARDCLU: it also arises for criteria such as
those suggested by Diamond (1967), Epstein and Segal (1992) and Grant at al.
(2010).
Given this feature of PARDCLU criteria, there are two possible routes, which we
want to explore in future work. One direction would be to reject consequentialism
and assume that choices may depend on what could have happened. The issue then
is whether the relevant information can be summarized in a practical way in specific
economic environments, so that the dependence is manageable for public decision
making. Another direction would be to accept that the social criterion is not time-
consistent, and to device techniques such as sophisticated planning (see Pollak, 1968;
Blackorby et al., 1973, for early references) to ensure the time consistency of choices
17
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(at the cost of optimality from the point of view of the initial criterion). We could
compare in specific economic models such sophisticated planning to naive planning,
in particular when fertility choices are endogenous.
A second important feature of evaluation based on PARDCLU is how it handles
the risk on the planning horizon. According to PARDCLU, it is the total population,
rather than the planning horizon, that matters. In particular, social evaluation based
on PARDCLU is completely indifferent between having 10 billion people alive for
100 years and 1 billion people alive for 1000 years if all have the same well-being and
live for sure, as total population is the same in both alternatives. One may object to
this conclusion on the basis that people might prefer to live in a society with more
people (so as to have richer scope for social interactions), or on the contrary to have
more descendants.
Note that the issue extends to the case where population size is risky. If well-
being is perfectly equal, then only expected total population size matters, so that
society is completely risk neutral with respect to the risk on population size. Eval-
uation based on PARDCLU is indifferent whether n people exist for sure, or n1
people exist with probability p and n2 people with probability 1− p, provided that
pn1 + (1 − p)n2 = n. This is in stark contrast with criteria exhibiting catastrophe
avoidance in the sense of Bommier and Zuber (2008).
A last issue is sustainability. Zuber and Asheim (2012, Section 6) show how
RDU leads to sustainable outcomes in models of economic growth within a setting
where there are infinitely many time periods. This basic support for sustainability
does not extend to the present criterion with endogenous population size and prob-
ability of existence, where the main concern is to avoid lives with low well-being.
A stark conclusion is that it might be socially preferable to increase the per-period
probability of extinction if per capita well-being is decreasing over time, as this in-
creases the utility weight on the better off earlier generations. This points towards
re-evaluating the concept of sustainability in a context where the number of future
generations is bounded and their existence is uncertain, and where there might be
a trade-off between the number of future people and their well-being.
A possible way to deal with both the indifference to risk on total population
size and the willingness to ensure the existence of future people would be to include
sentiments, and in particular the altruistic feelings parents have towards their de-
scendants. There is a growing literature on social and altruistic preferences, both
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from a theoretical and from an experimental perspective (classical references in-
clude Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin,
2002; Andreoni and Miller, 2002). In general, there might be an argument in favor
of distinguishing the conception of justice from the forces (like altruism) that are
instrumental in attaining it, e.g., if impartiality follows from considering an orig-
inal position where individuals do not have extensive times of natural sentiments
(Rawls, 1971, p. 129). However, considering the social context in which people live
seems essential when applying PARDCLU in a setting where population size and
probability of existence are endogenous. In particular, a more pro-natal implication
would follow if we assume that the well-being of individuals depends also on their
reproductive choices, so that well-being of one generation increases with the size and
living conditions of the next generation.
The implications of including sentiments for the PARDCLU approach (and for
population ethics in general) is left for future research.
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
To prove the Theorem 1, we need to introduce subsets of X. For any k ∈ N, denote
by X1/k =
{
x ∈ X : xpi = 1/k, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n(x)}
}
the set of allocations where all
individuals have the same rational probability 1/k of existing. Denote by Q++ the
positive rational numbers and by XQ++ =
{
x ∈ X : xpi ∈ Q++, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n(x)}
}
the set of allocations where all individuals have probabilities of existing which are
positive rational numbers.
It is straightforward to show that (2) implies (1) in Theorem 1. We show that
(1) implies (2) by proving the four following lemmas.
We start with Lemmas 1 and 2 which establish how the representation result
of Asheim and Zuber (2014) can be extended to the present case as long as the
probabilities of existence are given by rational numbers.
Lemma 1 If Axioms 1–7 hold, then there exists c ∈ R+, δ ∈ R++ and a continuous
and increasing function u : R→ R such that for any k ∈ N for any x,y ∈ X1/k,
x % y⇐⇒
∫ ν(x)
0
e−δρ
(
u(x[ρ])− u(c)
)
dρ ≥
∫ ν(y)
0
e−δρ
(
u(y[ρ])− u(c)
)
dρ
Proof. For any k ∈ N, Axioms 1–7 above restricted to X1/k collapse to Axioms 1–7
of Asheim and Zuber (2014), provided we take p = 1/k in Axioms 4-7. Hence, by
Theorem 1 of Asheim and Zuber (2014) there exist β1/k ∈ (0, 1) and a continuous
increasing function u1/k : R→ R such that, for all x, y ∈ X1/k, x % y if and only if
(1− β1/k)
∑n(x)
r=1
βr−11/k
(
u1/k
(
xwpi(r)
)− u1/k(c))
≥ (1− β1/k)
∑n(y)
r=1
βr−11/k
(
u1/k
(
ywpi(r)
)− u1/k(c)), (A.1)
where the critical level parameter c is determined by Axiom 6 and is therefore
independent of k, and where the factor 1− β1/k ensures that utility weights sum up
to 1− βn(x)1/k and 1− β
n(y)
1/k respectively.
Consider any x,y ∈ X1 such that n(x) = n(y) = n. For any k ∈ N, construct
xˆ, yˆ ∈ X1/k such that n(xˆ) = n(yˆ) = nk and, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, xˆwki−j = xwi and
yˆwki−j = y
w
i for all j ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}. By construction, ν(x) = ν(y) = ν(xˆ) = ν(yˆ) =
n, x[ ] = xˆ[ ] and y[ ] = yˆ[ ]. By Axioms 1, 2 and 3, we have x % y ⇐⇒ xˆ % yˆ, and
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therefore, using the above representation:
(1− β1)
∑n
r=1
βr−11 u1
(
x(pi(r)
) ≥ (1− β1)∑n
r=1
βr−11 u1
(
y(pi(r))
)
⇐⇒ (1− β1/k)
∑nk
r′=1
βr
′−1
1/k u1/k
(
xˆ(pi(r′)
) ≥ (1− β1/k)∑nk
r′=1
βr
′−1
1/k u1/k
(
yˆ(pi(r′))
)
⇐⇒ (1− βk1/k)
∑n
r=1
(βk1/k)
r−1u1/k
(
x(pi(r)
)
≥ (1− βk1/k)
∑nk
r′=1
(βk1/k)
r−1u1/k
(
y(pi(r))
)
since (1− β1/k)
∑k
r′=1β
r′−1
1/k = 1− βk1/k. Because additive representations are unique
up to an affine transformation, the above equivalence implies βk1/k = β1 and that we
can set u1/k = u1, using the normalization u1/k(0) = u1(0) = 0.
Denoting p = 1/k and δ = − lnβ1, this implies that β1/k = (β1)1/k = e−δp.
Moreover, since
(1− βp)βr−1p =
(
1− e−δp
)
e−δp(r−1) = e−δp(r−1) − e−δpr = δ
∫ pr
p(r−1)
e−δρdρ ,
and by denoting u = u1 we can rewrite inequality (A.1) as:
δ
∫ ν(x)
0
e−δρ
(
u(x[ρ])− u(c)
)
dρ ≥ δ
∫ ν(y)
0
e−δρ
(
u(y[ρ])− u(c)
)
dρ ,
where ν(x) = n(x)/k and ν(y) = n(y)/k. This establishes Lemma 1.
Lemmas 2 is concerned only with the same-number case, as a separate argument
has to be used anyway for the case where the difference between the probability
adjusted population size of two different allocations is irrational.
Lemma 2 If Axioms 1–7 hold, then there exists c ∈ R+, δ ∈ R++ and a continuous
and increasing function u : R→ R such that for any ν ∈ Q++, for any x,y ∈ XQ++
such that ν(x) = ν(y) = ν,
x % y⇐⇒
∫ ν
0
e−δρu(x[ρ])dρ ≥
∫ ν
0
e−δρu(y[ρ])dρ
Proof. For any x,y ∈ XQ++ such that ν(x) = ν(y) = ν, let k be the least common
denominator of all the probabilities in the two allocations. This means that for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n(x}} there exists a positive integer `xi such that xpi = `xi /k. Similarly,
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n(y}}, there exists a positive integer `yi such that ypi = `yj /k.
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We can construct xˆ, yˆ ∈ X1/k in the following way:6
(a) For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n(x)}, xˆw
`+
∑i−1
j=1 `
x
j
= xwi , for all ` ∈ {1, . . . , `xi };
(b) For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n(y)}, yˆw
`+
∑i−1
j=1 `
y
j
= ywi , for all ` ∈ {1, . . . , `yi }.
By construction, ν(x) = ν(y) = ν(xˆ) = ν(yˆ) = n, x[ ] = xˆ[ ] and y[ ] = yˆ[ ], and
x % y ⇐⇒ xˆ % yˆ
⇐⇒
∫ ν
0
e−δρu(x[ρ])dρ ≥
∫ ν
0
e−δρu(y[ρ])dρ
by Axioms 1, 2, 3, and Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 shows how the representation of Lemma 2 in the same-number case
(where the compared allocations have the same probability adjusted population size)
can be applied also when probabilities of existence are allowed to irrational, using
the property that the rational numbers are dense in the real numbers.
Lemma 3 If Axioms 1–7 hold, then there exist c ∈ R+, δ ∈ R++ and a continuous
and increasing function u : R→ R such that for any ν ∈ R++, for any x, y ∈ Xν ,
x % y⇐⇒
∫ ν
0
e−δρu(x[ρ])dρ ≥
∫ ν
0
e−δρu(y[ρ])dρ (A.2)
Proof. Consider any ν ∈ R++, and any x, y ∈ Xν . If x, y ∈ Q++ (so that
ν ∈ Q++), then Lemma 2 yields the result. Assume therefore that x, y /∈ Q++
and more specifically that xpi ∈ Q++ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n(x)− 1}, ypi ∈ Q++ for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , n(y)− 1}, and xn(x), yn(y) /∈ Q++. Assuming that the last individual is
the one with an irrational probability of existing is made without loss of generality
because of Axiom 3. Extension of the proof to more than one individual with an
irrational probability of existing is similar to the one developed below. Because of
Axiom 1, equivalence (A.2) holds if and only if the following equivalence holds:
x  y⇐⇒
∫ ν
0
e−δρu(x[ρ])dρ >
∫ ν
0
e−δρu(y[ρ])dρ . (A.3)
Step 1: x  y =⇒ ∫ ν0 e−δρu(x[ρ])dρ > ∫ ν0 e−δρu(y[ρ])dρ.
6Using the convention
∑0
j=1 `
x
j =
∑0
j=1 `
y
j = 0.
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Assume that x  y. By Axiom 2, there exists x˜ ∈ Xν such that x˜[ ] < x[ ] and
x˜  y. It is sufficient to show ∫ ν0 e−δρu(x˜[ρ])dρ ≥ ∫ ν0 e−δρu(y[ρ])dρ since then it
follows by the definitions of the step functions x[ ] and x˜[ ] that x[ ] > x˜[ ] implies∫ ν
0 e
−δρu(x[ρ])dρ >
∫ ν
0 e
−δρu(y[ρ])dρ.
Let νˆ ∈ Q++ such that 0 < νˆ − ν < 1, and denote pˆ = νˆ − ν. Let px˜ ∈ Q++ be
such that 0 < px˜ < x˜
p
n(x˜) and denote εx˜ = x˜
p
n(x˜) − px˜. Likewise, let py ∈ Q++ be
such that xpn(y) < py < pˆ and denote εy = py − xpn(y).
Let z = max{x˜[ν],y[ν]}. By Axiom 4,
x˜  y =⇒ (x˜, zpˆ) % (y, zpˆ) .
Construct xˆ, yˆ ∈ Xνˆ such that
(a) xˆi = x˜i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n(x˜)− 1}; xˆn(x˜) = (x˜wn(x˜), px˜); xˆn(x˜)+1 = (z, pˆ+ εx˜);
(b) yˆi = yi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n(y)− 1}; yˆn(y) = (ywn(y), py); yˆn(y)+1 = (z, pˆ− εy).
By construction, ν(xˆ) = ν(yˆ) = ν(x˜, zpˆ) = ν(y, zpˆ) = νˆ, xˆ[ ] > (x˜, zpˆ)[ ] and yˆ[ ] <
(y, zpˆ)[ ]. By Axioms 1 and 3,
(x˜, zpˆ) % (y, zpˆ) =⇒ xˆ  yˆ .
Also, by construction, xˆ, yˆ ∈ XQ++ .7 Hence, by Lemma 2, we know that
xˆ  yˆ⇐⇒
∫ ν′
0
e−δρu(xˆ[ρ])dρ >
∫ ν′
0
e−δρu(yˆ[ρ])dρ
Let r˜ be the rank of xn(x˜) in x˜ and r be the rank of yn(y) in y. By definition of
xˆ[ ] and yˆ[ ], we have:
∫ νˆ
0
e−δρu(xˆ[ρ])dρ
=
∫ ρr˜−εx˜
0
e−δρu(x˜[ρ])dρ+ eδεx˜
∫ ν
ρr˜
e−δρu(x˜[ρr˜])dρ
+
∫ ν
ν−εx˜
e−δρu(z)dρ+
∫ νˆ
ν
e−δρu(z)dρ
7Indeed, ν − x˜pn(x˜) and ν − ypn(y) are rational number because all individuals but the last one
have rational probabilities of existing.
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=∫ ν
0
e−δρu(x˜[ρ])dρ+ (eδεx˜ − 1)
∫ ν
ρr˜
e−δρu(x˜[ρr˜])dρ−
∫ ρr˜
ρr˜−εx˜
e−δρu(xwn(x˜))dρ
+
∫ ν
ν−εx˜
e−δρu(z)dρ+
∫ νˆ
ν
e−δρu(z)dρ
=
∫ ν
0
e−δρu(x˜[ρ])dρ+
∫ νˆ
ν
e−δρu(z)dρ
+ (eδεx˜ − 1)
(∫ ν
ρr˜
e−δρu(x˜[ρr˜])dρ+
e−δνu(z)−e−δρr˜u(x˜w
n(x˜)
)
δ
)
and likewise∫ νˆ
0
e−δρu(yˆ[ρ])dρ
=
∫ ρr+εy
0
e−δρu(y[ρ])dρ+ e−δεy
∫ ν
ρr
e−δρu(y[ρr])dρ
−
∫ ν+εy
ν
e−δρu(z)dρ+
∫ νˆ
ν
e−δρu(z)dρ
=
∫ ν
0
e−δρu(y[ρ])dρ+
∫ νˆ
ν
e−δρu(z)dρ
− (1− e−δεy)
(∫ ν
ρr
e−δρu(y[ρr])dρ+
e−δνu(z)−e−δρru(xw
n(y)
)
δ
)
To sum up: x  y =⇒ x˜  y =⇒ (x˜, (z)pˆ) % (y, (z)pˆ) =⇒ xˆ  yˆ =⇒∫ ν
0
e−δρu(x˜[ρ])dρ+ (eδεx˜ − 1)
(∫ ν
ρr˜
e−δρu(x˜[ρr˜])dρ+
e−δνu(z)−e−δρr˜u(x˜w
n(x˜)
)
δ
)
>∫ ν
0
e−δρu(y[ρ])dρ− (1− e−δεy)
(∫ ν
ρr
e−δρu(y[ρr])dρ+
e−δνu(z)−e−δρru(xw
n(y)
)
δ
)
.
This implication is true for any (εx˜, εy) ∈ R2++ as defined above. Since rational
number are dense in the real number, it is possible to find a sequence of ((εx˜, εy)) ∈
(R2)N such that each of εx˜ and εy tends to zero. Hence:
x  y =⇒
∫ ν
0
e−δρu(x˜[ρ])dρ ≥
∫ ν
0
e−δρu(y[ρ])dρ .
Figure 1 illustrates the construction of the different allocations involved in Step 1.
Step 2:
∫ ν
0 e
−δρu(x[ρ])dρ >
∫ ν
0 e
−δρu(y[ρ])dρ =⇒ x  y.
Assume that
∫ ν
0 e
−δρu(x[ρ])dρ >
∫ ν
0 e
−δρu(y[ρ])dρ. Since rational number are
dense in real numbers, it is possible to find (εx, εy) ∈ (0, 1)2 such that px = xpn(x)+εx
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Probability adjusted
population size
well-being
νˆν
z
εx˜εy
(x˜, (z)pˆ)[ ] :
xˆ[ ] :
(y, (z)pˆ)[ ] :
yˆ[ ] :
Figure 1: Allocations involved in Step 1 of the proof
and py = y
p
n(y) − εy satisfy (px, py) ∈ Q2++, and:
∫ ν
0 e
−δρu(x[ρ])dρ− (1− e−δεx)
(∫ ν
ρr˜
e−δρu(x[ρr˜])dρ+
e−δνu(z)−e−δρr˜u(xw
n(x)
)
δ
)
>
∫ ν
0 e
−δρu(y[ρ])dρ+ (eδεy − 1)
(∫ ν
ρr
e−δρu(y[ρr])dρ+
e−δνu(z)−e−δρru(xw
n(y)
)
δ
)
where r˜ is the rank of xn(x) in x, r is the rank of yn(y) in y, and z = max{x˜[ν],y[ν]}.
Let εx < pˆ < 1 be such that νˆ = ν + pˆ satisfies νˆ ∈ Q++. We can construct xˆ,
yˆ ∈ Xνˆ in the following way:
(a) xˆi = xi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n(x)− 1}; xˆn(x) = (xwn(x), px); xˆn(x)+1 = (z, pˆ− εx);
(b) yˆi = yi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n(y)− 1}; yˆn(y) = (ywn(y), py); yˆn(y)+1 = (z, pˆ+ εy);
so that xˆ, yˆ ∈ XQ++ , ν(xˆ) = ν(yˆ) = ν(x, (z)pˆ) = ν(y, (z)pˆ) = νˆ, xˆ[ ] < (x, (z)pˆ)[ ]
and yˆ[ ] > (y, (z)pˆ)[ ] (see Figure 2).
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Probability adjusted
population size
well-being
νˆν
z
εxεy
(x, (z)pˆ)[ ] :
xˆ[ ] :
(y, (z)pˆ)[ ] :
yˆ[ ] :
Figure 2: Allocations involved in Step 2 of the proof
By Lemma 2 and by construction of xˆ and yˆ,∫ ν
0
e−δρu(x[ρ])dρ− (1− e−δεx)
(∫ ν
ρr
e−δρu(x[ρr])dρ+
e−δνu(z)−e−δρru(xw
n(x)
)
δ
)
>∫ ν
0
e−δρu(y[ρ])dρ+ (eδεy − 1)
(∫ ν
ρr′
e−δρu(y[ρr′ ])dρ+
e−δνu(z)−e−δρr′ u(xw
n(y)
)
δ
)
=⇒ ∫ νˆ0 e−δρu(xˆ[ρ])dρ > ∫ νˆ0 e−δρu(yˆ[ρ])dρ =⇒ xˆ  yˆ. And by Axioms 1, 3 and 4,
xˆ  yˆ =⇒ (x, (z)pˆ)  (y, (z)pˆ) =⇒ x  y.
Finally, we extend the representation to the entire domain X of all finite al-
locations (thereby also considering allocations with different probability adjusted
population sizes) by showing that any finite allocation x can be made as bad as an
allocation where all individuals are at the critical level c by adding sufficiently many
people at a low well-being level z, and thus indifferent to an egalitarian allocation
where each individual’s well-being equals x ≤ c. This allows us to apply Axiom 6,
thereby completing the demonstration of the result that statement (1) of Theorem
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1 implies statement (2).
Lemma 4 If Axioms 1-7 hold, then there exists c ∈ R+, δ ∈ R++ and a continuous
and increasing function u : R→ R such that for any x,y ∈ X,
x % y⇐⇒
∫ ν(x)
0
e−δρ
(
u(x[ρ])− u(c)
)
dρ ≥
∫ ν(y)
0
e−δρ
(
u(y[ρ])− u(c)
)
dρ . (A.4)
Proof. Step 1: Representation when well-being does not exceed c.
Let c ∈ R+ be the critical level parameter defined in Axiom 6.
Assume that x, y ∈ X are such that x[ν(x)] ≤ c and y[ν(y)] ≤ c. If ν(x) = ν(y),
then equivalence (A.4) follows from Lemma 3. Therefore, assume that ν(x) < ν(y)
(the case ν(x) > ν(y) can be treated similarly). Let k := minl∈N{` : (ν(y) −
ν(x))/` ≤ 1} and p = (ν(y) − ν(x))/k. Then, by k applications of Axiom 6, using
Axiom 5 repeatedly to ensure that the allocation is in Xν when Axiom 6 is applied,
x ∼ (x, (c)kp). By Axiom 1 and Lemma 3:
x % y ⇐⇒ (x, (c)kp) % y
⇐⇒
∫ ν(x)
0
e−δρu
(
x[ρ]
)
dρ+
∫ ν(y)
ν(x)
e−δρu(c)dρ ≥
∫ ν(y)
0
e−δρu
(
y[ρ]
)
dρ
⇐⇒
∫ ν(x)
0
e−δρ
(
u
(
x[ρ]
)− u(c))dρ ≥ ∫ ν(y)
0
e−δρ
(
u
(
y[ρ]
)− u(c))dρ .
Step 2: Equally distributed equivalent.
For any ν ∈ R++ and x ∈ Xν , let the ν–equally distributed equivalent of x,
denoted eν(x), be x ∈ R such that (x)ν ∼ x. Axioms 1–3 imply that eν : Xν → R
is well-defined. By Lemma 3, and since Axioms 1–7 hold, it is defined as follows:
eν(x) = u
−1
(
δ
1−e−δν
∫ ν
0
e−δρu(x[ρ])dρ
)
.
Let x ∈ Xν and z < min{x[0], c}, leading to the following expression for k ∈ N:
eν+k
(
x, (z)k
)
= u−1
(
δ
1−e−δ(ν+k)
(∫ k
0
e−δρu(z)dρ+
∫ ν+k
k
e−δρu(x[ρ−k])dρ
))
= u−1
(
1−e−δk
1−e−δ(ν+k)u(z) +
e−δk−e−δ(ν+k)
1−e−δ(ν+k) · δ1−e−δν
∫ ν
0
e−δρu(x[ρ])dρ
)
.
Write a(k) :=
(
1 − e−δk)/(1 − e−δ(ν+k)); note that a : N → R is an increasing
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function of k converging to 1. Since z < x[0] ≤ eν(x) and
eν+k
(
x, (z)k
)
= u−1
(
a(k)u(z) + (1− a(k))u(eν(x))) ,
it follows that eν+k
(
x, (z)k
)
is a decreasing function of k converging to z as k ap-
proaches infinity. As z < c, we deduce that, for any x ∈ X, there exists K(x) ∈ N
such that, for all k ≥ K(x), eν(x)+k
(
x, (z)k
) ≤ c.
Step 3: Conclusion. For any x, y ∈ X, choose z such that z < min{x[0],y[0], z}.
Let ` = max{K(x),K(y)}, x = eν(x)+`
(
x, (z)`
)
and y = eν(y)+`
(
y, (z)`
)
. By defini-
tion, (x, (z)`) ∼ (x)ν(x)+`, (y, (z)`) ∼ (y)ν(y)+`, x ≤ c and y ≤ c. Hence, by repeated
applications of Axioms 1 and 5, and by Step 1:
x % y ⇐⇒ (x, (z)`) % (y, (z)`)
⇐⇒ (x)ν(x)+` % (y)ν(y)+`
⇐⇒
∫ ν(x)+`
0
e−δρ (u(x)− u(c)) dρ ≥
∫ ν(y)+`
0
e−δρ (u(y)− u(c)) dρ .
However, by the definition of equally distributed equivalents,∫ ν(x)+`
0
e−δρu(x)dρ =
∫ `
0
e−δρu(z)dρ+ e−δ`
∫ ν(x)
0
e−δρu(x[ρ])dρ ,∫ ν(y)+`
0
e−δρu(x)dρ =
∫ `
0
e−δρu(z)dρ+ e−δ`
∫ ν(y)
0
e−δρu(y[ρ])dρ ,
Thereby we obtain equivalence (A.4).
Appendix B: Proofs of results in Section 5
Proof of Proposition 1. If a PARDCLU SWO satisfies Axiom 8, then u is
concave. Assume that a PARDCLU SWO satisfies Axiom 8. Consider x ∈ X such
that n(x) = 2, xw1 = z ≤ z′ = xw2 and xp1 = xp2 = pi. Let y ∈ X such that n(y) = 2,
yw1 = z − ε < z′ + ε = yw2 and yp1 = yp2 = pi, with ε > 0. By Axiom 8, it must be the
case that x  y. By the representation of PARDCLU SWOs in Definition 1, this
implies that:
(
1− e−δpi)u(z) + (e−δpi− e−δ2pi)u(z′) > (1− e−δpi)u(z− ε) + (e−δpi− e−δ2pi)u(z′+ ε) ,
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which can be rewritten:
1 > e−δpi
u
(
xτ ′ + ε
)− u(xτ ′)
u
(
xτ
)− u(xτ − ε) . (B.1)
Equation (B.1) must be true for any arbitrarily small pi > 0. Hence, we must
have that
u(z) + u(z′) ≥ u(z − ε) + u(z′ + ε) . (B.2)
Equation (B.2) must be true for any z, z′ ∈ R such that z < z′ and any ε > 0. This
implies that u must be concave.
If a PARDCLU SWO is such that u is concave in its representation, then it
satisfies Axiom 8. Consider the representation of a PARDCLU in Definition 1, and
assume that u is concave.
Consider any x, y ∈ X such that n(x) = n(y) = ν and there exist i, j ∈
{1, · · · , n} and ε ∈ R++ such that ywi +ε = xwi ≤ xwj = ywj −ε, ypi = xpi = xpj = ypj = pi
and (xwk , x
p
k) = (y
w
k , y
p
k) for all k ∈
{
1, · · · , n} \ {i, j}
)
. Let pi : {1, . . . , n(x)} →
{1, . . . , n(x)} be a bijection that reorders individuals in increasing well-being order
in x:
xwpi(r) ≤ xwpi(r+1) for all r ∈ {1, . . . , n(x)− 1} ,
and define ρ =
∑
r:pi(r)<pi(i) x
p
pi(r) and ρ¯ =
∑
r:pi(r)<pi(j) x
p
pi(r) (i.e. the cumulative
probability weights of people whose well-being is below i and j respectively). Sim-
ilarly, let p˜i : {1, . . . , n(x)} → {1, . . . , n(x)} be a bijection that reorders individuals
in increasing well-being order in y:
ywp˜i(r) ≤ ywp˜i(r+1) for all r ∈ {1, . . . , n(x)− 1} ,
and define ρ′ =
∑
r:p˜i(r)<p˜i(i) y
p
p˜i(r) and ρ¯
′ =
∑
r:p˜i(r)<p˜i(j) x
p
p˜i(r).
By Axiom 8, it must be the case that x  y. Given the representation of
PARDCLU SWO in Definition 1, for this to be true we need to have (with ν =
ν(x) = ν(y)):∫ ρ
0
e−δρ
(
u(x[ρ])− u(c)
)
dρ
+
e−δρ(1− e−δpi)
δ
(
u(xwi )− u(c)
)
+
∫ ρ¯
ρ+pi
e−δρ
(
u(x[ρ])− u(c)
)
dρ
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+
e−δρ¯(1− e−δpi)
δ
(
u(xwj )− u(c)
)
+
∫ ν
ρ¯+pi
e−δρ
(
u(x[ρ])− u(c)
)
dρ
>
∫ ρ′
0
e−δρ
(
u(y[ρ])− u(c)
)
dρ
+
e−δρ
′
(1− e−δpi)
δ
(
u(xwi − ε)− u(c)
)
+
∫ ρ¯′
ρ′+pi
e−δρ
(
u(y[ρ])− u(c)
)
dρ
+
e−δρ¯′(1− e−δpi)
δ
(
u(xwj + ε)− u(c)
)
+
∫ ν
ρ¯′+pi
e−δρ
(
u(y[ρ])− u(c)
)
dρ
By definition of x and y and using ρ′ ≤ ρ ≤ ρ¯ ≤ ρ¯′, this can be simplified to:8
∫ ρ
ρ′
e−δρu(x[ρ])dρ+
e−δρ(1− e−δpi)
δ
u(xwi )
+
e−δρ¯(1− e−δpi)
δ
u(xwj ) + e
−δpi
∫ ρ¯′
ρ¯
e−δρu(x[ρ+pi])dρ
>
e−δρ
′
(1− e−δpi)
δ
u(xwi − ε) + e−δpi
∫ ρ
ρ′
e−δρu(y[ρ+pi])dρ
+
∫ ρ¯′
ρ¯
e−δρu(y[ρ])dρ+
e−δρ¯′(1− e−δpi)
δ
u(xwj + ε)
or rewritten:9
e−δρ
(
u(xwi )− u(xwi − ε)
)
− e−δρ¯
(
u(xwj + ε)− u(xwj )
)
>− δ
(∫ ρ
ρ′
e−δρ
(
u(x[ρ])− u(xwi − ε)
)
dρ+
∫ ρ¯′
ρ¯
e−δρ
(
u(xwj + ε)− u(y[ρ])
)
dρ
)
.
The second term of the inequality is always negative, by definition of x and y. The
first term can be written
e−δρ
(
u(xwi )− u(xwi − ε)
)(
1− e−δ(ρ¯−ρ)u(x
w
j + ε)− u(xwj )
u(xwi )− u(xwi − ε)
)
,
8In particular,
∫ ρ′
0
e−δρu(x[ρ])dρ =
∫ ρ′
0
e−δρu(y[ρ])dρ,
∫ ρ¯
ρ+pi
e−δρu(x[ρ])dρ =
∫ ρ¯
ρ+pi
e−δρu(y[ρ])dρ
and
∫ ν
ρ¯′+pi e
−δρu(x[ρ])dρ =
∫ ν
ρ¯′+pi e
−δρu(y[ρ])dρ.
9We use the fact that x[ρ] = y[ρ+pi] on the interval [ρ
′, ρ] and y[ρ] = x[ρ+pi] on the interval [ρ¯, ρ¯
′].
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which is strictly positive when u is concave, since then e−δ(ρ¯−ρ) < 1 and
u(xwj + ε)− u(xwj )
u(xwi )− u(xwi − ε)
≤ 1 .
Hence the concavity of u is sufficient to guarantee that x  y as required by Axiom
8.
The following lemma is used to prove Proposition 2.
Lemma 5 If the SWR % on X satisfies Axioms 1–6 and 8, then for any k ∈ N one
of the following must be true:
1. There exists β1/k ∈ (0, 1) and a continuous and increasing function u1/k : R→
R such that, for all x, y ∈ X1/k, x % y if and only if
(1− β1/k)
∑n(x)
r=1
βr−11/k
(
u1/k
(
xwpi(r)
)− u1/k(c))
≥ (1− β1/k)
∑n(y)
r=1
βr−11/k
(
u1/k
(
ywpi(r)
)− u1/k(c)). (B.3)
2. There exists a continuous increasing and concave function u1/k : R→ R such
that, for all x, y ∈ X1/k, x % y if and only if
∑n(x)
r=1
1
k
(
u1/k
(
xwpi(r)
)− u1/k(c)) ≥∑n(y)
r=1
1
k
(
u1/k
(
ywpi(r)
)− u1/k(c)). (B.3 ′)
Proof. Axioms 1–6 above restricted to X1/k collapse to Axioms 1–6 of Asheim
and Zuber (2014), provided we take p = 1/k in Axioms 4-6. Hence, by Lemma 1
of Asheim and Zuber (2014) there exist β1/k ∈ R++ and a continuous increasing
function u1/k : R → R such that, for all x, y ∈ X1/k such that n(x) = n(y) = n,
x % y if and only if
∑n
r=1
βr−11/k
(
u1/k
(
xwpi(r)
)− u1/k(c)) ≥∑n
r=1
βr−11/k
(
u1/k
(
ywpi(r)
)− u1/k(c)). (B.4)
Consider x,y ∈ X1/k such that n(x) = n(x) = 2, xw1 = z ≤ z′ = xw2 , yw1 =
z − ε < z′ + ε = yw2 and xp1 = xp2 = yp1 = yp2 = 1/k. By Axiom 8, it must be the case
that x  y. By equation (B.4), this implies that:
1 > β1/k
u1/k(z
′ + ε)− u1/k(z′)
u(z)− u(z + ε) .
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This must be true for any z ≤ z′ and ε > 0. But Chateauneuf, Cohen and Meilijson
(2005) proved that
sup
z≤z′,ε>0
u1/k(z
′ + ε)− u1/k(z′)
u(z)− u(z + ε) ≥ 1 .
Hence, if β1/k > 1, there would exist z ≤ z′ and ε > 0 such that
β1/k
u1/k(z
′ + ε)− u1/k(z′)
u(z)− u(z + ε) > 1 ,
a violation of Axiom 8. Thus, we have that β1/k ≤ 1.
In the case β1/k < 1, inequation B.4 can be rewritten:
(1−β1/k)
∑n
r=1
βr−11/k
(
u1/k
(
xwpi(r)
)−u1/k(c)) ≥ (1−β1/k)∑n
r=1
βr−11/k
(
u1/k
(
ywpi(r)
)−u1/k(c)).
Lemma 2 in Asheim and Zuber (2014) still applies, and we do not need their Lemma
3. The rest of the proof of Theorem 1 in Asheim and Zuber (2014) follows. As
indicated above (Lemma 1), the first case of this lemma is simply Theorem 1 in
Asheim and Zuber (2014) in the case where individuals’ probabilities of existence
are equal to 1/k.
In the generalized utilitarian case (β1/k = 1), inequation B.4 can be rewritten:
∑n
r=1
1
k
(
u1/k
(
xwpi(r)
)− u1/k(c)) ≥∑n
r=1
1
k
(
u1/k
(
ywpi(r)
)− u1/k(c)).
We obtain that, for all x, y ∈ X1/k, x % y if and only if
∑n(x)
r=1
1
k
(
u1/k
(
xwpi(r)
)− u1/k(c)) ≥∑n(y)
r=1
1
k
(
u1/k
(
ywpi(r)
)− u1/k(c))
by adapting Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 in Asheim and Zuber (2014).
Proof of Proposition 2. By Lemma 5, there are two cases to consider.
Case 1: There exists β1/k ∈ (0, 1) and a continuous and increasing function
u1/k : R→ R such that, for all x, y ∈ X1/k, x % y if and only if (B.3) holds.
In this case, Lemma 1 in Appendix A then still holds when substituting Axiom
8 for Axiom 7 and the rest of the proof of Theorem 1 can be used to address cases
where probabilities are not all the same rational numbers. Hence, in this case, the
SWR % is a PARDCLU SWO. The sufficiency part of Proposition 1 implies that u
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must be concave.
Case 2: There exists a continuous increasing and concave function u1/k : R→ R
such that, for all x, y ∈ X1/k, x % y if and only if (B.3 ′) holds.
The rest of of the proof of Theorem 1 can be adapted to address cases where
probabilities are not all the same rational numbers. Hence, in this case, the SWR
% is a PACLU SWO. Standard arguments imply that u must be strictly concave to
satisfy Axiom 8.
Proof of Proposition 3. If c = 0 in the definition of the PARDCLU SWO,
then for any x, y ∈ R and for any ν, ν ′ ∈ R++, (x)ν  (y)ν′ ⇐⇒ (1 − e−δν)
(
u(x) −
u(0)
)
> (1 − e−δν′)(u(y) − u(0)). But if x > 0 ≥ y, it is also the case that u(x) −
u(0) > 0 ≥ u(y) − u(0) because u is increasing. Hence we necessarily have (x)ν 
(y)ν′ in that case.
Conversely, assume that c > 0. Consider c > x > 0 ≥ y such that
u(x)− u(y) = ε < e
−δ(1− e−δ)
1− e−2δ
(
u(c)− u(0)) .
By continuity of u, it is always possible to find x and y close enough to 0 that satisfy
this condition. Then (1 − e−2δ)ε < e−δ(1 − e−δ)(u(c) − u(y)) = ((1 − e−δ) − (1 −
e−2δ)
)(
u(y)− u(c)), so that (1− e−2δ)(u(x)− u(c)) = (1− e−2δ)(u(y) + ε− u(c)) <
(1 − e−δ)(u(y) − u(c)). By definition of the PARDCLU SWO, this implies that
(y)1  (x)2, which is a violation of Axiom 9.
Proof of Proposition 4. Assume that the SWR % satisfies Axioms 1, 7,
8, 9 and 10, and consider any x, y ∈ R++ and n,m ∈ N such that (x)n  (y)m.10
By Axiom 7, there exists z ∈ R such that, for all N ∈ N, (x)n  (z)k  (y)m for
some k ≥ N . By Axiom 9, we must have z > 0, otherwise there exists k such that
(z)k  (y)m while y > 0 ≥ z.
Let N = max
(
n + 1, nxz + 1
)
. There must exist k ≥ N such that (x)n  (z)k.
Define ε = kk−nz − nk−nx; ε > 0 because k ≥ N .11 By repeated applications of
Axioms 10 and 1, we know that ((x)n, (ε)k−n) % (x)n. But (z)k can be obtained
from ((x)n, (ε)k−n) through a finite sequence of transfers from people with welfare
10By Axioms 1, 8 and 10, there must exist such numbers.
11If z ≥ x, k ≥ N = n + 1 so that k
k−n >
n
k−n , which (together with z ≥ x) implies that ε > 0.
If 0 < z < x, k ≥ nx
z
+ 1 so that kz − nx ≥ z > 0 and kz−nx
k−n > 0.
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x to people with welfare ε when ε < x, or through a finite sequence of transfers
from people with welfare ε to people with welfare x when ε > x.12 Given that all
individuals have a probability 1 of existence, by repeated applications of Axioms 8
and 1, we obtain that (z)k  ((x)n, (ε)k−n). By transitivity (Axiom 1), we obtain
(z)k  (x)n, which contradicts (x)n  (z)k.
12In the case ε = x, we already have ((x)n, (ε)k−n) = (z)k % (x)n, which contradicts that
(x)n  (z)k.
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